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Abstract
Herbrand’s theorem, widely regarded as a cornerstone of proof theory, exposes some of the
constructive content of classical logic. In its simplest form, it reduces the validity of a first-order
purely existential formula to that of a finite disjunction. In the general case, it reduces first-order
validity to propositional validity, by understanding the structure of the assignment of first-order
terms to existential quantifiers, and the causal dependency between quantifiers.
In this paper, we show that Herbrand’s theorem in its general form can be elegantly stated
and proved as a theorem in the framework of concurrent games, a denotational semantics designed
to faithfully represent causality and independence in concurrent systems, thereby exposing the
concurrency underlying the computational content of classical proofs. The causal structure of
concurrent strategies, paired with annotations by first-order terms, is used to specify the depend-
ency between quantifiers implicit in proofs. Furthermore concurrent strategies can be composed,
yielding a compositional proof of Herbrand’s theorem, simply by interpreting classical sequent
proofs in a well-chosen denotational model.
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1 Introduction
“What more do we know when we have proved a theorem
by restricted means than if we merely know it is true?”
Kreisel’s question is the driving force for much modern Proof Theory. This paper is concerned
with Herbrand’s Theorem, perhaps the earliest result in that direction. It is a simple
consequence of completeness and compactness in first-order logic. So it is an example of
information being extracted from the bare fact of provability. Usually by contrast one thinks
in terms of extracting information from the proofs themselves, typically - as in Kohlenbach’s
proof mining - via some form of functional interpretation. This has the advantage that
information is extracted compositionally in the spirit of functional programming. Specifically
information for ` A and ` A→ B can be composed to give information for ` B; or, in terms
of the sequent calculus, we can interpret the cut rule.
It seems to be folklore that there is a problem for Herbrand’s Theorem. That is made
precise in Kohlenbach [17] which shows that one cannot hope directly to use collections of
Herbrand terms for ` A and ` A→ B to give a collection for ` B. That leaves the possibility
of making some richer data compositional, realised indirectly in Gerhardy and Kohlenbach [11]
with data provided by Shoenfield’s version [30] of Gödel’s Dialectica Interpretation [14].
Now functional interpretations make no pretence to be faithful to the structure of proofs as
encapsulated in systems like the sequent calculus: they explore in a sequential order terms
proposed by a proof as witnesses for existential quantifiers, but this order is certainly not
intrinsic to the proof. Thus it is compelling to seek some compositional form of Herbrand’s
Theorem faithful to the structure of proofs and to the dependency between terms; for
cut-free proofs, Miller’s expansion trees [24] capture precisely this “Herbrand content” (the
information pertaining to quantifier instantiations), but not compositionally.
In this paper, we provide such a compositional form of Herbrand’s theorem, presented as
a game semantics for first-order classical logic. Our games have two players, both playing on
the quantifiers of a formula ϕ. ∃loïse, playing the existential quantifiers, defends the validity
of ϕ. ∀bélard, playing the universal quantifiers, attempts to falsify it. This understanding
of formulas as games is folklore in mathematical logic and computer science. However, like
functional interpretations, such games are usually sequential [7, 19]. In contrast, our model
captures the exact dependence and independence between quantifiers. To achieve that we
build on concurrent/asynchronous games [23, 27, 4], which marry game semantics with the
so-called true concurrency approach to models of concurrent systems, and avoid interleavings.
So in a formal sense, our model highlights a parallelism inherent to classical proofs. In
essence, our strategies are close to expansion trees enriched with an explicit acyclicity witness.
The computational content of classical logic is a longstanding active topic, with a wealth
of related works, and it is hard to do it justice in this short introduction. There are, roughly
speaking, two families of approaches. On the one hand, some (including the functional
interpretations mentioned above) extract from proofs a sequential procedure, e.g. via
translation to sequential calculi or by annotating a proof to sequentialize or determinize its
behaviour under cut reduction [13, 8]. Other than that cited above, influential developments in
this “polarized” approach include work by Berardi [2], Coquand [7], Parigot [26], Krivine [18],
and others. Polarization yields better-behaved dynamics and a non-degenerate equational
theory, but distorts the intent of the proof by an added unintended sequentiality. On the other
hand, some works avoid polarization – including, of course, Gentzen’s Hauptsatz [10]. This
causes issues, notably unrestricted cut reduction yields a degenerate equational theory [13]
and enjoys only weak, rather than strong, normalization [8]. Nevertheless, witness extraction
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remains possible (though it is non-deterministic). Particularly relevant to our endeavour is a
recent activity around the matter of enriching expansion trees so as to support cuts. This
includes Heijltjes’ proof forests [15], McKinley’s Herbrand nets [21], and Hetzl and Weller’s
recent expansion trees with cuts [16]. In all three cases, a generalization of expansion trees
allowing cuts is given along with a weakly normalizing cut reduction procedure. Intuitions
from games are often mentioned, but the methods used are syntactic and based on rewriting.
Other related works include Laurent’s model for the first-order λµ-calculus [19], whose
annotation of moves via first-order terms is similar to ours; and Mimram’s categorical present-
ation of a games model for a linear first-order logic without propositional connectives [25].
Since our model avoids polarization, some phenomena from the proof theory of classical
logic reflect in it: our semantics does not preserve cut reduction – if it did, it would be a
boolean algebra [13]. Yet it preserves it in a sense for first-order MLL [12]. Likewise, just
as classical proofs can lead to arbitrary large cut-free proofs [8], our semantics may yield
infinite strategies, from which finite sub-strategies can nonetheless always be extracted. This
reflects that non-polarized proof systems for classical logic are often only weakly normalizing.
In Section 2 we recall Herbrand’s theorem, and introduce the game-theoretic language
leading to our compositional reformulation of it. The rest of the paper describes the
interpretation of proofs as winning strategies: in Section 3 we give the interpretation of
propositional MLL, in Section 4 we deal with quantifiers, and finally, in Section 5, we add
contraction and weakening and complete the interpretation.
2 From Herbrand to winning Σ-strategies
A signature is Σ = (Σf ,Σp), with Σf a countable set of function symbols (f, g, h, etc.
range over function symbols), and Σp a countable set of predicate symbols (P,Q, etc.
range over predicate symbols). There is an arity function ar : Σf ]Σp → N where ] is the
usual set-theoretic union, where argument sets are disjoint. For a relative gain in simplicity
in some arguments and examples, we assume that Σ has at least one constant symbol, i.e., a
function symbol of arity 0. We use a, b, c, . . . to range over constant symbols.
If V is a set of variable names, we write TmΣ(V) for the set of first-order terms on Σ
with free variables in V. We use variables t, s, u, v, . . . to range over terms. Literals have
the form P(t1, . . . , tn) or ¬P(t1, . . . , tn), where P is a n-ary predicate symbol and the tis are
terms. Formulas are also closed under quantifiers, and the connectives ∨ and ∧. Negation
is not considered a logical connective: the negation ϕ⊥ of ϕ is obtained by De Morgan
rules. We write FormΣ(V) for the set of first-order formulas on Σ with free variables in V ,
and use ϕ,ψ, . . . to range over them. We also write QFΣ(V) for the set of quantifier-free
formulas. Finally, we write fv(ϕ) or fv(t) for the set of free variables in a formula ϕ or a
term t. Formulas are considered up to α-conversion and satisfy Barendregt’s convention.
2.1 Herbrand’s theorem
Intuitionistic logic has the witness property: if ∃xϕ holds intuitionistically, then there is
some term t such that ϕ(t) holds. While this fails in classical logic, Herbrand’s theorem, in
its popular form, gives a weakened classical version, a finite disjunction property.
I Theorem 1. Let T be a theory finitely axiomatized by universal formulas. Let ψ =
∃x1 . . . ∃xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn) be a purely existential formula (ϕ ∈ QFΣ). Then, T |= ψ iff there
are closed terms (ti,j)1≤i≤p,1≤j≤n such that T |=
∨p
i=1 ϕ(ti,1, . . . , ti,n).
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∃x∀y¬P(x) ∨ P(y)
x:=c x:=y
∀y¬P(c) ∨ P(y)
y
∀z¬P(y) ∨ P(z)
z
¬P(c) ∨ P(y) ¬P(y) ∨ P(z)
∃c
_
∃y
_
∀y
7 77A
∀z
Figure 1 An expansion tree and winning Σ-strategy for DF.
∀x1_  %%,
∀x2
+rry _
∃f(x2,x1) ∃x1
Figure 2 A partially
ordered winning Σ-strategy.
∃x1∀y1P(x1, y1) ∨ ∃x2∀y2¬P(y2, x2)
∃x1∀y1P(x1, y1)
x1:=y2
∃x2∀y2¬P(y2, x2)
x2:=y1
∀y1P(y2, y1)
y1
∀y2¬P(y2, y1)
y2
P(y2, y1) ¬P(y2, y1)
Figure 3 An incorrect expansion tree.
∃1 . . . ∃n . . .
∀1 ∀n
Figure 4 The arena JDF K∃.
I Example 2. Consider the formula ψ = ∃x¬P(x)∨P(f(x)) (where f ∈ Σf ). A valid Herbrand
disjunction for ψ is (¬P(c)∨P(f(c)))∨(¬P(f(c))∨P(f(f(c)))) where c is some constant symbol.
A similar disjunction property holds for general formulas, though it is harder to state. A
common way to do so is by reduction to the above: a formula ϕ is converted to prenex normal
form and universally quantified variables are replaced with new function symbols added to
Σ, in a process called Herbrandization (dual to Skolemization). For instance, the drinker’s
formula (DF): ∃x∀y¬P(x) ∨ P(y), yields by Herbrandization the formula ψ of Example 2.
Instead, to avoid prenexification and Skolemization and the corresponding distortion of
the formula, one may adopt a representation of proofs that displays the instantiation of
existential quantifiers with finitely many witnesses while staying structurally faithful to the
original formula. To that end Miller proposes expansion trees [24]. They can be introduced
via a game-theoretic metaphor, reminiscent of [7]. Two players, ∃loïse and ∀bélard, debate
the validity of a formula. On a formula ∀xϕ, ∀bélard provides a fresh variable x and the game
keeps going on ϕ. On ∃xϕ, ∃loïse provides a term t, possibly containing variables previously
introduced by ∀bélard. ∃loïse, though, has a special power: at any time she can backtrack to
a previous existential position, and propose a new term. Figure 1 (left) shows an expansion
tree for DF. It may be read from top to bottom, and from left to right: ∃loïse plays c, then
∀bélard introduces y, then ∃loïse backtracks (we jump to the right branch) and plays y, and
finally ∀bélard introduces z. ∃loïse wins: the disjunction of the leaves is a tautology.
However the metaphor has limits, it suggests a sequential ordering between branches,
which expansion trees do not have in reality: the order is only implicit in the term annotations.
Besides, the natural ordering between quantifiers induced by terms is not always sequential.
It is, of course, always acyclic – on expansion trees this is ensured by an acyclicity correctness
criterion, whose necessity is made obvious by the (incorrect) expansion tree of Figure 3
“proving” a falsehood. This acyclicity entails the existence of a sequentialization, but
committing to one is an arbitrary choice not forced by the proof.
A partial order is much more faithful to the proof. In this paper, we show that expansion
trees can be made compositional modulo a change of perspective: rather than derived we
consider this order primitive, and only later decorate it with term annotations. For instance,
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we display in Figure 2 the formal object, called a (sequential) winning Σ-strategy, matching
in our framework the expansion tree for DF. Another winning Σ-strategy, displayed in Figure
2, illustrates that this order is not always naturally sequential. By lack of space we do not
define expansion trees here, though they are captured in essence by our strategies.
2.2 Expansion trees as winning Σ-strategies
We now introduce our formulation of expansion trees as Σ-strategies. Although our definitions
look superficially very different from Miller’s, the only fundamental difference is the explicit
display of the dependency between quantifiers. Σ-strategies will be certain partial orders,
with elements either “∀ events” or “∃ events”. Events will carry terms, in a way that respects
causal dependency. Σ-strategies will play on games representing the formulas. The first
component of a game is its arena, that specifies the causal ordering between quantifiers.
I Definition 3. An arena is A = (|A|,≤A,polA) where |A| is a set of events, ≤A is a
partial order that is forest-shaped:
(1) if a1 ≤A a and a2 ≤A a, then either a1 ≤A a2 or a2 ≤A a1, and
(2) for all a ∈ |A|, the branch [a]A = {a′ ∈ A | a′ ≤A a} is finite.
Finally, polA : |A| → {∀,∃} is a polarity function which expresses if a move belongs to
∃loïse or ∀bélard.
A configuration of an arena (or any partial order) is a down-closed set of events. We
write C∞(A) for the set of configurations of A, and C (A) for the set of finite configurations.
The arena only describes the moves available to both players; it says nothing about terms
or winning. Similarly to expansion trees where only ∃loïse can replicate her moves, our
arenas will at first be biased towards ∃loïse: each ∃ move exists in as many copies as she
might desire, whereas ∀ events are a priori not copied. Figure 4 shows the ∃-biased arena
JDF K∃ for DF. The order is drawn from top to bottom. Although only ∃loïse can replicate
her moves, the universal quantifier is also copied as it depends on the existential quantifier.
Strategies on an arena A will be certain augmentations of prefixes of A. They carry causal
dependency between quantifiers induced by term annotations, but not the terms themselves.
For any partial order A and a1, a2 ∈ |A|, we write a1 _A a2 (or a1 _ a2 if A is clear from
the context) if a1 <A a2 with no other event in between – this notation was used implicitly
in Figures 1 and 2. We call _ immediate causal dependency.
I Definition 4. A strategy σ on arena A, written σ : A, is a partial order (|σ|,≤σ) with
|σ| ⊆ |A|, such that for all a ∈ |σ|, [a]σ is finite (an elementary event structure); subject to:
(1) Arena-respecting. We have C∞(σ) ⊆ C∞(A),
(2) Receptivity. If x ∈ C (σ) s.t. x ∪ {a∀} ∈ C (A), then a ∈ |σ|,
(3) Courtesy. If a1_σa2 and (pol(a1) = ∃ or pol(a2) = ∀), then a1_Aa2.
These strategies are essentially the receptive ingenuous strategies of Melliès and Mimram
[23], though their formulation, with a direct handle on causality, is closer to Rideau and
Winskel’s later concurrent strategies [27]. Receptivity means that ∃loïse cannot refuse to
acknowledge a move by ∀bélard, and courtesy that the only new causal constraints that she
can enforce with respect to the game is that some existential quantifiers depend on some
universal quantifiers. Ignoring terms, Figure 2 (right) displays a strategy on the arena of
Figure 4 – in Figure 2 we also show via dotted lines the immediate dependency of the arena.
Let us now add terms, and define Σ-strategies.
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I Definition 5. A Σ-strategy on arena A is a strategy σ : A, with a labelling function
λσ : |σ| → TmΣ(|σ|), satisfying (with [a]∀σ = {a′ ∈ |σ| | a′ ≤σ a & polA(a′) = ∀}):
(1) Σ-receptivity: ∀a∀ ∈ |σ|, λσ(a) = a,
(2) Σ-courtesy: ∀a∃ ∈ |σ|, λσ(a) ∈ TmΣ([a]∀σ).
Rather than having ∀ moves introduce fresh variables, we consider them as variables
themselves. Hence, the ∃ moves carry terms having as free variables the ∀ moves in their
causal history. For instance the diagram of Figure 1 (right) is meant formally to denote the
one on the right (where superscripts are the terms given by λ). In the sequel we omit the
(redundant) annotation of ∀bélard’s events.
∃c1
_
∃∀12_
∀1∀1
4 55?
∀2∀2
Besides the fact that they are not assumed finite, Σ-strategies are more
general than expansion trees: they have an explicit causal ordering, which
may be more constraining than that given by the terms. A Σ-strategy σ : A
is minimal iff whenever a1 _σ a2 such that a1 6∈ fv(λσ(a2)), then a1 _A a2
as well. In a minimal Σ-strategy σ : A, the ordering ≤σ is actually redundant and can be
uniquely recovered from λσ and ≤A.
Now, we adjoin winning conditions to arenas and define winning Σ-strategies. As in
expansion trees, we aim to capture that the substitution (by terms from the strategies) of
the expansion of the original formula is a tautology.
I Definition 6. A game A is an arena A, with WA : (x ∈ C∞(A))→ QF∞Σ (x) expressing
winning conditions, where QF∞Σ (x) denotes the infinitary quantifier-free formulas –
obtained from QFΣ(x) by adding infinitary connectives
∨
i∈I ϕi and
∧
i∈I ϕi, with I countable.
For a game interpreting a formula ϕ, the winning conditions associate configurations of
the arena JϕK with the propositional part of the corresponding expansion of ϕ. For instance:
WJDF K∃({∃3,∀3,∃6,∀6}) = (¬P(∃3) ∨ P(∀3)) ∨ (¬P(∃6) ∨ P(∀6))
WJDF K∃({∃3,∀3,∃6}) = (¬P(∃3) ∨ P(∀3)) ∨ >
recalling that the arena for DF appears in Figure 4. In the second clause, > (the true
formula) comes from ∀bélard not having played ∀6 yet, yielding victory to ∃loïse on that
copy. The winning conditions yield syntactic, uninterpreted formulas: we keep the second
formula as-is although it is equivalent to >. Finally, we can define winning strategies.
I Definition 7. If σ : A is a Σ-strategy and x ∈ C∞(σ), we say that x is tautological
in σ if the formula WA(x)[λσ] corresponding to the substitution of WA(x) ∈ QF∞Σ (x) by
λσ : x→ TmΣ(x), is a (possibly infinite) tautology.
Then, a Σ-strategy σ : A is winning if for any x ∈ C∞(σ) that is ∃-maximal (i.e., such
that for all a ∈ |σ| with x ∪ {a} ∈ C∞(σ), polA(a) = ∀), x is tautological.
Finally, a Σ-strategy σ : A is top-winning if |σ| ∈ C∞(σ) is tautological.
2.3 Constructions on games and Herbrand’s theorem
To complete our statement of Herbrand’s theorem with Σ-strategies, it remains to set the
interpretation of formulas as games. To that end we introduce a few constructions on games,
first at the level of arenas and then enriched with winning conditions. We write ∅ for the
empty arena. If A is an arena, A⊥ is its dual, with same events and causality but polarity
reversed. We review some other constructions.
I Definition 8. The simple parallel composition A1 ‖ A2 of A1 and A2 has as events the
tagged disjoint union {1}×|A1|]{2}×|A2|, as causal order that given by (i, a) ≤A1‖A2 (j, a′)
iff i = j and a ≤Ai a′, and, as polarity polA1‖A2((i, a)) = polAi(a).
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J>K∃V = 1 JP(t1, . . . , tn)K∃V = P(t1, . . . , tn) J∃xϕK∃V = ?∃x.JϕKV]{x} Jϕ1 ∨ ϕ2K∃V = Jϕ1K∃V ` Jϕ2K∃V
J⊥K∃V = ⊥ J¬P(t1, . . . , tn)K∃V = ¬P(t1, . . . , tn) J∀xϕK∃V = ∀x.JϕKV]{x} Jϕ1 ∧ ϕ2K∃V = Jϕ1K∃V ⊗ Jϕ2K∃V
Figure 5 ∃-biased interpretation of formulas.
Configurations x ∈ C∞(A ‖ B) have the form {1} × xA ∪ {2} × xB with xA ∈ C∞(A)
and xB ∈ C∞(B), which we write x = xA ‖ xB . This construction has a general counterpart
‖i∈I Ai with I at most countable, defined likewise. In particular we will later use the uniform
countably infinite parallel composition ‖ω A. Another important construction is prefixing.
I Definition 9. For α ∈ {∀,∃} and A an arena, α.A has events {(1, α)} ∪ {2} × |A| and
causality (i, a) ≤ (j, a′) iff i = j = 2 and a ≤A a′, or (i, a) = (1, α); i.e., (1, α) is the unique
minimal event. Its polarity is polα.A((1, α)) = α and polα.A((2, a)) = polA(a).
Configurations x ∈ C∞(α.A) are ∅, or {(1, α)} ∪ {2} × xA (xA ∈ C∞(A)), written α.xA.
Now, let us enrich these with winning, yielding the constructions on games used for
interpreting formulas. Importantly, the inductive interpretation of formulas requires us to
consider formulas with free variables. For V a finite set, a V-game is defined as a game A
(Def. 6), except that winning may also depend on V: for x ∈ C∞(A), WA(x) ∈ QF∞Σ]V(x).
We now define all our constructions, on V-games rather than games. The duality
(−)⊥ extends to V-games, simply by negating the winning conditions: for all x ∈ C∞(A),
WA⊥(x) =WA(x)⊥. The ‖ of arenas gives rise to two constructions, ⊗ and `, on V-games:
I Definition 10. For A and B V-games, we define two V-games with arena A ‖ B and winning
conditionsWA⊗B(xA ‖ xB) =WA(xA)∧WB(xB) andWA`B(xA ‖ xB) =WA(xA)∨WB(xB).
Note the implicit renaming so that WA(xA),WB(xB) are in QF∞Σ]V(xA ‖ xB) rather than
QF∞Σ]V(xA),QF
∞
Σ]V(xB) respectively – we will often keep such renamings implicit.
Observe that ⊗ and ` are De Morgan duals, i.e., (A⊗ B)⊥ = A⊥ ` B⊥. We write these
operations ⊗ and ` rather than ∧ and ∨, because they behave more like the connectives of
linear logic [12] than those of classical logic; for each V the ⊗ and ` will form the basis of a
∗-autonomous structure and hence a model of multiplicative linear logic (see Section 3).
To interpret classical logic however, we will need replication.
I Definition 11. For V-game A, we define the V-games !A, ?A with arena ‖ωA and winning:
W!A(‖i∈ω xi) =
∧
i∈ω
WA(xi) W?A(‖i∈ω xi) =
∨
i∈ω
WA(xi)
Though W!A(x) (resp. W?A(x)) is an infinite conjunction (resp. disjunction), it simplifies
to a finite one when x visits finitely many copies (with cofinitely many copies of WA(∅)).
Next we show how V-games support quantifiers.
I Definition 12. Let A a (V ] {x})-game, we define the V-game ∀x.A and its dual ∃x.A
with arenas ∀.A and ∃.A respectively, with W∀x.A(∅) = >, W∃x.A(∅) = ⊥, and:
W∀x.A(∀.xA) =WA(xA)[∀/x] W∃x.A(∃.xA) =WA(xA)[∃/x]
Finally, we regard a literal ϕ as a V-game on arena ∅, with Wϕ(∅) = ϕ. We write 1 and
⊥ for the unit V-games on arena ∅ with winning conditions respectively > and ⊥.
Putting these together, we give in Figure 5 the ∃-biased interpretation of a formula
ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V) as a V-game. Note the difference between the case of existential and universal
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V-MLL
Ax
`V ϕ⊥, ϕ
fv(ϕ) ⊆ V Cut
`V Γ, ϕ `V ϕ⊥,∆
`V Γ,∆
Ex
`V Γ, ϕ, ψ,∆
`V Γ, ψ, ϕ,∆
>I
`V >
⊥I
`V Γ
`V Γ,⊥
∧I
`V Γ, ϕ `V ψ,∆
`V Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
∨I
`V Γ, ϕ, ψ,∆
`V Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
First-order MLL (MLL1)
∀I
`V]{x} Γ, ϕ
`V Γ,∀x. ϕ
x 6∈ fv(Γ) ∃I
`V Γ, ϕ[t/x]
`V Γ,∃x. ϕ
t ∈ TmΣ(V)
LK
C
`V Γ, ϕ, ϕ
`V Γ, ϕ
W
`V Γ
`V Γ, ϕ
Figure 6 Rules for the sequent calculus LK.
formulas, reflecting the bias towards ∃loïse. This is indeed compatible with the examples
given previously. We can now state our concurrent version of Herbrand’s theorem.
I Theorem 13. For any ϕ ∈ FormΣ, |= ϕ iff there exists a finite, top-winning σ : JϕK∃.
Besides the game-theoretic language, the difference with expansion trees is superficial: on
ϕ, expansion trees essentially coincide with the minimal top-winning Σ-strategies σ : JϕK∃.
The effort to change view point, from a syntactic construction to a (game) semantic one, will
however pay off now, when we show how to compose Σ-strategies.
2.4 Compositional Herbrand’s theorem
Unlike expansion trees, strategies can be composed. Whereas Theorem 13 above could be
deduced via the connection with expansion trees, that proof would intrinsically rely on the
admissibility of cut in the sequent calculus. Instead, we will give an alternative proof of
Herbrand’s theorem where the witnesses are obtained truly compositionally from any sequent
proof, without first eliminating cuts. In other words, strategies will come naturally from the
interpretation of the classical sequent calculus in a semantic model.
To compose Σ-strategies, we must restore the symmetry between ∃loïse and ∀bélard in the
interpretation of formulas. The non-biased interpretation JϕKV of ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V) is defined as
for JϕK∃V , except for J∀xϕKV = !∀x.JϕKV]{x}. Thus we lose finiteness: ∃loïse must be reactive
to the infinite number of copies potentially opened by ∀bélard. But we can now state:
I Theorem 14. For ϕ closed, the following are equivalent: (1) |= ϕ, (2) there exists a finite,
top-winning Σ-strategy σ : JϕK∃, (3) there exists a winning Σ-strategy σ : JϕK.
Proof. That (2) implies (1) is easy, as a finite top-winning σ : JϕK∃ directly informs a proof.
That (3) implies (2) is more subtle: first, one may restrict a winning σ : JϕK to JϕK∃ to
obtain a finite top-winning strategy. However, this top-winning strategy may not be finite.
Yet, it follows by compactness that there is always a finite top-winning sub-strategy that
may be effectively computed from σ. See the Appendix C for details.
The proof that (1) implies (3) is our main contribution: a winning strategy will be
computed from a proof using our denotational model of classical proofs. J
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Our source sequent calculus (Figure 6) is fairly standard, one-sided, with rules presented
in the multiplicative style. A notable variation is that sequents carry a set V of free variables,
that may appear freely in formulas. The introduction rule for ∀ introduces a fresh variable,
whereas the introduction rule for ∃ provides a term whose free variables must be in V.
What mathematical structure is required to interpret this sequent calculus? Ignoring the
V annotations, the first group is nothing but Multiplicative Linear Logic (MLL). Propositional
(V-)MLL can be interpreted in a ∗-autonomous category [3]. Accordingly, in Section 3, we first
construct a ∗-autonomous category Ga of games and winning Σ-strategies. Then, in Section 4,
we build the structure required for the interpretation of quantifiers, still ignoring contraction
and weakening. For each set of variables V we construct a ∗-autonomous category V-Ga,
with a fibred structure to link the V-Ga together for distinct Vs and suitable structure to
deal with quantifiers, obtaining a model of first-order MLL. Finally in Section 5 we complete
the interpretation by adding the exponential modalities from linear logic to the interpretation
of quantifiers, and get from that an interpretation of contraction and weakening.
3 A ∗-autonomous category
The following theorem, on cut reduction for MLL, is folklore.
I Theorem 15. There is a set of reduction rules on MLL sequent proofs, written  MLL,
such that for any proof π of a sequent ` Γ, there is a cut-free π′ of Γ such that π  ∗MLL π′.
The reduction  MLL comprises logical reductions, reducing a cut on a formula ϕ/ϕ⊥,
between two proofs starting with the introduction rule for the main connective of ϕ/ϕ⊥; and
structural reductions, consisting in commutations between rules so as to reach the logical
steps. We assume some familiarity with this process.
In this section we aim to give an interpretation of MLL proofs, which should be invariant
under cut-elimination. Categorical logic tells us that this is essentially the same as producing
a ∗-autonomous category. We opt here for the equivalent formulation by Cockett and Seely
as a symmetric linearly distributive category with negation [6].
I Definition 16. A symmetric linearly distributive category is a category C with
two symmetric monoidal structures (⊗, 1) and (`,⊥) which distribute: there is a natural
δA,B,C : A⊗(B`C) C→ (A⊗B)`C, the linear distribution, subject to coherence conditions [6].
A symmetric linearly distributive category with negation also has a function (−)⊥ on
objects and families of maps ηA : 1 C→A⊥ `A and εA : A⊗A⊥ C→⊥ such that the canonical
composition A→ A⊗ (A⊥`A)→ (A⊗A⊥)`A→ A, and its dual A⊥ → A⊥, are identities.
Note also the degenerate case of a compact closed category, which is a symmetric
linearly distributive category where the monoidal structures (⊗, 1) and (`,⊥) coincide.
Abusing terminology, we will refer to symmetric linearly distributive categories with
negation by the shorter ∗-autonomous categories. This should not create any confusion
in the light of their equivalence [6]. If C a ∗-autonomous category comes with a choice of
JP(t1, . . . , tn)K (an object of C) for all closed literal, then this interpretation can be extended
to all closed quantifier-free formulas following Figure 5. For all such ϕ, we have Jϕ⊥K = JϕK⊥.
The interpretation of MLL proofs in a ∗-autonomous category C is standard [29]: a proof
π of a MLL sequent ` ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is interpreted as a morphism JπK : 1 C→ Jϕ1K ` · · ·` JϕnK.
This interpretation is sound w.r.t. provability: if ϕ is provable, then 1→C JϕK is inhabited.
Furthermore, the categorical laws make this interpretation invariant under cut reduction.
I Theorem 17. If π  MLL π′ are proofs of ` Γ, JπK = Jπ′K.
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Figure 7 Interaction of σ : 1⊥ ‖ (∃1∀2∃3 ‖ ∃4) and τ : (∃1∀2∃3 ‖ ∃4)⊥ ‖ ∃5.
So a proof has the same denotation as its cut-free form obtained by Theorem 15. In the
rest of this section we construct a concrete ∗-autonomous category of games and winning
Σ-strategies; supporting the interpretation of MLL. This is done in three stages: first we focus
on composition of Σ-strategies (without winning), then we extend this to a compact closed
category. Finally, adding back winning, we split ‖ into two ⊗ and `, and prove ∗-autonomy.
3.1 Composition of Σ-strategies
We construct a category ArΣ having arenas as objects, and as morphisms from A to B
the Σ-strategies σ : A⊥ ‖ B, also written σ : AArΣ+ //B. The composition of σ : AArΣ+ //B and
τ : B ArΣ+ //C will be computed in two stages: first, the interaction τ ~ σ is obtained as the
most general partial-order-with-terms satisfying the constraints given by both σ and τ –
Figure 7 displays such an interaction. Then, we will obtain the composition τ  σ by hiding
events in B. In the example of Figure 7 we get the single annotated event ∃f(g(c),h(c))5 .
We fix some definitions on terms and substitutions. If V1,V2 are sets, a substitution
γ : V1 S→V2 is a function γ : V2 → TmΣ(V1). For t ∈ TmΣ(V2), we write t[γ] ∈ TmΣ(V1)
for the substitution operation. Substitutions form a category S, which is cartesian: the
empty set ∅ is terminal, and the product of V1 and V2 is their disjoint union V1 + V2. From
γ : V1 S→V2 and γ′ : V ′1 S→V2, we say that γ subsumes γ′, written γ′ 4 γ, if there is α : V ′1 S→V2
s.t. γ ◦ α = γ′ – giving a preorder on substitutions with codomain V2.
Consider first the closed interaction of two Σ-strategies σ : A and τ : A⊥. As they disagree
on the polarities on A we drop them – τ ~ σ will be a neutral Σ-strategy on a neutral arena:
I Definition 18. A neutral arena is an arena, without polarities. Neutral strategies
σ : A, are defined as in Definition 4 without (2), (3). Neutral Σ-strategies additionally
have λσ : (s ∈ |σ|)→ TmΣ([s]σ), and are idempotent: for all a ∈ |a|, λσ(a)[λσ] = λσ(a).
Forgetting polarities, every Σ-strategy is a neutral one. Given σ and τ , τ ~σ is a minimal
strengthening of σ and τ , regarding both the causal structure and term annotations, i.e., a
meet for the partial order (idempotence above is required for it to be antisymmetric):
I Definition 19. For σ, τ : A neutral Σ-strategies, we write σ 4 τ iff |σ| ⊆ |τ |, C∞(σ) ⊆
C∞(τ), and for all x ∈ C (|σ|), λτ  x subsumes λσ  x (regarded as substitutions x S→x).
Ignoring terms, any two σ and τ have a meet σ ∧ τ ; this is a simplification of the pullback
in the category of event structures, exploiting the absence of conflict [31]. The partial order
(|σ ∧ τ |,≤σ∧τ ) has events all common moves of σ and τ with a causal history compatible
with both ≤σ and ≤τ , and for ≤σ∧τ the minimal causal order compatible with both.
However, two neutral Σ-strategies do not necessarily have a meet for 4 (see Example 45
in Appendix A). Hence, we focus on the meets occurring from compositions of Σ-strategies
and show that for σ : A and τ : A⊥ dual Σ-strategies the meet does exists:
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I Lemma 20. Any two Σ-strategies σ : A and τ : A⊥ have a meet σ ∧ τ .
Proof. We start with the causal meet σ ∧ τ , which we enrich with λσ∧τ the most general
unifier of λσ  |σ ∧ τ | and λτ  |σ ∧ τ |, obtained by well-founded induction on ≤σ∧τ :
λσ∧τ (a) =
{
λσ(a)[λσ∧τ  [a)] if polA(a) = ∃
λτ (a)[λσ∧τ  [a)] if polA(a) = ∀
where [a) = {a′ ∈ A | a′ <σ∧τ a}. It follows that this is indeed the m.g.u. – in particular, we
exploit that from Σ-courtesy, if a∃ ∈ |σ| then λσ(a) ∈ TmΣ([a)σ). J
However this is not sufficient: for composable σ : A⊥ ‖ B and τ : B⊥ ‖ C, the games are
not purely dual; we need to “pad out” σ and τ and compute instead (σ ‖ C⊥) ∧ (A ‖ τ),
where the parallel composition of Definition 8 is extended with terms in the obvious way, and
where λA(a) = a for all a ∈ |A|. Now σ ‖ C⊥ : A⊥ ‖ B ‖ C⊥ and A ‖ τ : A ‖ B⊥ ‖ C are
dual, but Σ-courtesy from Σ-strategies is relaxed to idempotence. Yet, Lemma 20 still holds
since, from idempotence, if a∃ ∈ |σ| then either λσ(a) ∈ TmΣ([a)σ) or λσ(a) = a. Hence, we
can define τ ~ σ = (σ ‖ C⊥) ∧ (A ‖ τ) : A ‖ B ‖ C.
Variables appearing in λτ~σ cannot be events in B – they must be negative in A⊥ ‖ C.
So we can define τ  σ = (τ ~ σ) ∩ (A ‖ C) the restriction of τ ~ σ to A ‖ C, with same
causal order and term annotation. The pair (|τ  σ|,≤τσ) is a strategy, as an instance of
the constructions in [4], and this extends to terms so that τ  σ : A⊥ ‖ C is a Σ-strategy,
the composition of σ and τ . Because interaction is defined as a meet for 4, it follows that
it is compatible with it, i.e., if σ 4 σ′, then τ ~ σ 4 τ ~ σ′. This is preserved by projection,
and hence τ  σ 4 τ  σ′ as well. This compatibility of composition with 4 will be used
later on, together with the easy fact that 4 is more constrained on Σ-strategies:
I Lemma 21. For σ, σ′ : A Σ-strategies, if σ 4 σ′, then λσ(s) = λσ′(s) for all s ∈ |σ|.
To complete our category, we also define the copycat strategy.
I Definition 22. For an arena A, the copycat Σ-strategy ccA : A⊥ ‖ A has events
| ccA| = A⊥ ‖ A. Writing (i, a) = (3− i, a), its partial order ≤ ccA is the transitive closure of
≤A⊥‖A ∪{(c, c) | c∀ ∈ |A⊥ ‖ A|} and its labelling function is λ ccA(c∀) = c, λ ccA(c∃) = c.
The proof of categorical laws are variations on construction of the bicategory in [4].
I Proposition 23. There is a poset-enriched category ArΣ with arenas as objects, and
Σ-strategies as morphisms.
3.2 Compact closed structure
We show that ArΣ is compact closed. The tensor product of arenas A and B is A ‖ B.
For Σ-strategies σ1 : A⊥1 ‖ B1 and σ2 : A⊥2 ‖ B2, we have σ1 ‖ σ2 : (A⊥1 ‖ B1) ‖ (A⊥2 ‖ B2),
which is isomorphic to (A1 ‖ A2)⊥ ‖ (B1 ‖ B2) – overloading notations, we also write
σ1 ‖ σ2 : (A1 ‖ A2)⊥ ‖ (B1 ‖ B2) for the obvious renaming. It is not difficult to prove:
I Proposition 24. Simple parallel composition yields an enriched functor ‖ : ArΣ ×ArΣ →
ArΣ.
For the compact closed structure, we elaborate the renaming used above. We write
f : A ∼= B for an isomorphism of arenas, preserving and reflecting all structure.
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I Definition 25. For f : A ∼= B and σ : A a Σ-strategy, the renaming f ∗ σ : B has
components |f ∗ σ| = f |σ|, ≤f∗σ= {(f a1, f a2) | a1 ≤σ a2} and λf∗σ(f a) = λσ(a)[f ].
In particular, if f : A ∼= B, then the corresponding copycat strategy is cc f = (A⊥ ‖
f) ∗ ccA : A⊥ ‖ B. We use this to define the structural morphisms for the symmetric
monoidal structure of ArΣ. For instance, the iso αA,B,C : (A ‖ B) ‖ C ∼= A ‖ (B ‖ C)
yields cc αA,B,C : (A ‖ B) ‖ C ArΣ+ //A ‖ (B ‖ C). The other structural morphisms arise similarly.
Coherence and naturality then follows from the key copycat lemma:
I Lemma 26. For σ : A⊥ ‖ B a Σ-strategy and f : B ∼= C, cc f  σ = (A⊥ ‖ f) ∗ σ : A⊥ ‖ C.
As a corollary we get coherence for the structural morphisms (following from those on
isomorphisms), and naturality. For all A we get ηA : ∅ArΣ+ //A⊥ ‖ A and εA : A ‖ A⊥ ArΣ+ //∅
as the obvious renamings of copycat. Checking the law for compact closed categories is a
variation of the idempotence of copycat. Overall:
I Proposition 27. ArΣ is a poset-enriched compact closed category.
3.3 A linearly distributive category with negation
Finally, we reinstate winning conditions. We first note:
I Proposition 28. There is a (poset-enriched) category GaΣ with objects the games (Defini-
tion 6) on Σ, and morphisms Σ-strategies σ : A⊥ ` B, also written σ : AGaΣ+ //B.
That copycat is winning boils down to the excluded middle. That τ  σ : A⊥ ` C is
winning if σ : A⊥ ` B and τ : B⊥ ` C are, is as in [5]: for x ∈ C (τ  σ) ∃-maximal we find
a witness y ∈ C (τ ~ σ) (i.e., y ∩ (A ‖ C) = x) s.t. y ∩ (A ‖ B) ∈ σ, y ∩ (B ‖ C) ∈ τ are
∃-maximal; and apply transitivity of implication. The equations follow from ArΣ. Likewise:
I Proposition 29. The functor ‖ : ArΣ ×ArΣ → ArΣ splits into ⊗,` : GaΣ ×GaΣ → GaΣ.
It suffices to check winning, which is straightforward. It remains to prove that all
structural morphisms from ArΣ (copycat strategies) are winning, which boils down to the
following sufficient conditions to hold: For A,B games, a win-iso f : A → B is an iso
f : A ∼= B such that (WA(x))⊥ ∨WB(f x) is a tautology, for all x ∈ C∞(A).
I Lemma 30. If f : A → B is a win-iso, then cc f : A⊥ ` B is a winning Σ-strategy.
This easily entails that all structural morphisms (including linear distributivity) are
winning. Finally ηA : 1GaΣ+ //A⊥ `A and εA : A⊗A⊥GaΣ+ //⊥ are winning, which concludes:
I Proposition 31. GaΣ is a poset-enriched ∗-autonomous category.
4 A model of first-order MLL
We move on to MLL1, i.e., all rules except for contraction and weakening. Before developing
the interpretation, we discuss cut elimination. There are three new cut reduction rules,
displayed in Figure 8: the new logical reduction (∀/∃), and two for the propagation of cuts
past introduction rules for ∀ and ∃. Writing π  MLL1 π′ for the reduction obtained with
these new rules together with  MLL:
I Proposition 32. Let π be any MLL1 proof of `V Γ. Then, there is a cut-free proof π′ of
`V Γ s.t. π  ∗MLL1 π
′.
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Cut
∀I
π1
`V]{x} Γ, ϕ
`V Γ,∀x. ϕ
∃I
π2
`V ϕ⊥[t/x],∆
`V ∃x. ϕ⊥,∆
`V Γ,∆
 ∀/∃ Cut
π1[t/x]
`V Γ, ϕ[t/x]
π2
`V ϕ⊥[t/x],∆
`V Γ,∆
Cut
π1
`V Γ, ψ
∀I
π2
`V]{x} ψ⊥,∆, ϕ
`V ψ⊥,∆,∀x. ϕ
`V Γ,∆,∀x. ϕ
 Cut/∀
Cut
π1
`V]{x} Γ, ψ
π2
`V]{x} ψ⊥,∆, ϕ
∀I
`V]{x} Γ,∆, ϕ
`V Γ,∆,∀x. ϕ
Cut
π1
`V Γ, ψ
∃I
π2
`V ψ⊥,∆, ϕ[t/x]
`V ψ⊥,∆,∃x. ϕ
`V Γ,∆,∃x. ϕ
 Cut/∃
Cut
π1
`V Γ, ψ
π2
`V ψ⊥,∆, ϕ[t/x]
∃I
`V Γ,∆, ϕ[t/x]
`V Γ,∆,∃x. ϕ
Figure 8 Additional cut elimination rules for MLL1.
The first rule of Figure 8 requires the introduction of substitution on proofs. In general,
for a proof π of `V2 Γ and γ : V1 → V2 we obtain π[γ] a proof of `V1 Γ[γ] by propagating γ
through π, substituting formulas and terms. A degenerate case of this is the substitution of
a proof π of `V Γ by weakening wV,x : V ] {x} → V, obtaining π1[wV,x], a proof of `V]x Γ.
As this leaves the formulas and terms unchanged we leave it implicit in the reduction rules –
it is used for instance implicitly in the commutation Cut/∀.
Substitution is key in the cut reduction of quantifiers. However it is best studied
independently of quantifiers, in a model of V-MLL (see Figure 6). This is the topic of the
next subsection, prior to the interpretation of the introduction rules for quantifiers.
4.1 A fibred model of V-MLL
Following [20, 28], we expect to model V-MLL and substitution in:
I Definition 33. Let ∗-Aut be the category of ∗-autonomous categories and functors pre-
serving the structure on the nose. A strict S-indexed ∗-autonomous category is a
functor T : Sop → ∗-Aut.
Such definitions (e.g. hyperdoctrines [28]) are usually phrased only up to isomorphism;
for simplicity we opt here for a lighter definition. Writing Vn = {x1, . . . , xn}, we say that T
supports Σ if for every predicate symbol P of arity n there is JPKVn a chosen object of T (Vn).
For t1, . . . , tn ∈ TmΣ(V) we can then set JP(t1, . . . , tn)K = T ([t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn])(JPKVn) an
object of T (V), also written JPKVn [t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn].
For any finite V , this lets us interpret V-MLL in T (V) as in Section 3. Besides V-MLL in
isolation, this also models substitutions. In games the functorial action of T on γ : V1 → V2
will correspond to substitution on games A[γ] = T (γ)(A) and strategies σ[γ] = T (γ)(σ).
This matches syntactic substitution, as T (γ) preserves the ∗-autonomous structure.
Let us now introduce the concrete structure. For any finite V, the fibre T (V) is the
category GaΣ]V built in Section 3, on the extended signature Σ ] V. Recall that its objects
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are games on the signature Σ ] V, i.e., the V-games of Section 2.3. Morphisms between
V-games A and B are winning (Σ]V)-strategies on A⊥`B regarded as a game on signature
Σ ] V – also called winning Σ-strategies on the V-game A⊥ ` B.
Finally, for A a V2-game and γ : V1 → V2 a substitution, the game T (γ)(A) = A[γ]
is defined as having arena A, and, for x ∈ C∞(A), WA[γ](x) = WA(x)[γ] ∈ QF∞Σ]V1(x).
Likewise, given A and B two V-games and σ : A⊥ ` B, σ[γ] has the same components as σ,
but term annotations λσ[γ](s) = λ(s)[γ] ∈ TmΣ]V1(x). It is a simple verification to prove:
I Proposition 34. For any γ : V1 S→V2, T (γ) : T (V2) → T (V1) is a strict ∗-autonomous
functor preserving the order.
4.2 Quantifiers
Finally, we give the interpretation of ∀I and ∃I. For now, we consider a linear interpretation
J−K` of formulas defined like J−K∃V except for J∃xϕK`V = ∃x.JϕK`V .
Besides preserving the ∗-autonomous structure, substitution also propagates through
quantifiers, from which we have:
I Lemma 35. Let ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V2) and γ : V1 → V2 a substitution, then Jϕ[γ]K`V1 = JϕK
`
V2 [γ].
This will be used implicitly from now on. The definition of quantifiers on games of
Definition 12 extends to functors ∀V,x,∃V,x : T (V ] {x}) → T (V). From σ : A⊥ ` B,
∀V,x(σ) : (∀x.A)⊥`∀x.B plays copycat on the initial ∀, then plays as σ (similarly for ∃V,x(σ)).
Following Lawvere [20], one expects adjunctions ∃V,x a T (wV,x) a ∀V,x. Unfortunately, this
fails – we present this failure later as the non-preservation of  Cut/∀.
We now interpret ∀I and ∃I. First, we give a strategy introducing a witness t.
I Definition 36. The (Σ ] V)-strategy ∃tA : A⊥ ‖ ∃.A is (|A⊥ ‖ ∃. A|,≤∃tA , λ∃tA) where ≤∃tA
includes≤ ccA , plus dependencies {((2,∃), (2, a)) | a ∈ A}]{((2,∃), (1, a)) | ∃a∀0 ∈ A. a0 ≤A a}
and term assignment that of ccA plus λ∃t
A
((2,∃)) = t.
In other words, ∃tA plays ∃ annotated with t, then proceeds as copycat on A. We have:
I Proposition 37. Let A be a V-game, and t ∈ TmΣ(V). Then, ∃tA : A[t/x]
V-GaΣ
+ // ∃x.A.
Indeed, any ∃-maximal xA ‖ ∃.xA ∈ C∞(∃tA) corresponds to a tautology WA[t/x](xA)⊥ ∨
WA(xA)[t/x]. We interpret ∃I by post-composing with ∃tA (as in Figure 10 without the last
step). This validates  Cut/∃, by associativity of composition.
To a strategy σ, the operation interpreting ∀I adds ∀ as new minimal event, and sets it
as a dependency for all events whose annotation comprise the distinguished variable x.
I Definition 38. For σ a (Σ ] V ] {x})-strategy on A⊥ ‖ B, the (Σ ] V)-strategy ∀I xA,B(σ) :
A⊥ ‖ ∀.B has events |σ| ] {(2,∀)}, term assignment λ((2,∀)) = (2,∀) and causality λ(s) =
λσ(s)[(2,∀)/x] (s ∈ |σ|), and ≤=≤σ ∪{((2,∀), s) | s ∈ ∀.B ∨ ∃s′ ≤σ s, x ∈ fv(λσ(s′))}.
I Proposition 39. If σ is winning on a (V]{x})-game A[wV,x]`B, then ∀I xA,B(σ) is winning
on the V-game A` ∀x.B.
Indeed, if ∀bélard does not play (2,∀) we get a tautology, otherwise the remaining
configuration is in σ and so is tautological. This completes the interpretation of MLL1. This
interpretation leaves  ∀/∃ invariant, but fails  Cut/∀. This stems from the fact that the
minimal Σ-strategies are not stable under composition (see Example 46 in Appendix A).
The interpretation of cut-free proofs yield minimal Σ-strategies. In contrast, in compositions
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Figure 9 Two examples of contraction.
interpreting cuts, causality may flow through the syntax tree of the cut formula, and create
causal dependencies not reflected in the variables. Hence, cut reduction may weaken the
causal structure.
I Lemma 40. For σ : AArΣ+ //B and τ : B
ArΣ]{x}
+ // C, we have ∀I xA,C(τ  σ) 4 ∀I
x
B,C(τ) σ.
By Lemma 21 these two have the same terms on common events. In fact, ∀I xA,C(τ  σ)
and ∀I xB,C(τ) σ also have the same events – they correspond to the same expansion tree,
only the acyclicity witness differs. But the variant of 4 with |σ1| = |σ2| is not a congruence:
relaxing causality of σ in τ  σ may unlock new events, previously part of causal loops.
As 4 is preserved by all operations on Σ-strategies, we deduce:
I Theorem 41. If π  MLL1 π′, then Jπ′K 4 JπK.
For MLL1, we conjecture that “having the same expansion tree” (i.e., same events and
term annotations) is actually a congruence, yielding a ∗-autonomous hyperdoctrine. As this
would not hold in the presence of contraction and weakening, we leave this for future work.
5 Contraction and weakening
In this section we reinstate ! and ? in the interpretation of quantifiers, i.e., J∀x. ϕKV =
!∀x. JϕKV]{x} and J∃xϕKV = ?∃x JϕKV]x – this is reminiscent of Melliès’ discussion on the
interaction between quantifiers and exponential modalities in a polarized setting [22].
Unlike for MLL1, we only aim to map proofs to Σ-strategies on the appropriate game,
with no preservation of reduction. We must interpret contraction and weakening, but also
revisit the interpretation of rules for quantifiers as the interpretation of formulas has changed.
Weakening is easy: for any game A, any Σ-strategy σ : A + //1 is winning; for definiteness,
we use the minimal eA : A + //1, only closed under receptivity. Contraction is much more
subtle. To illustrate the difficulty, we present in Figure 9 two simple instances of the
contraction Σ-strategy (without term annotations). The first looks like the usual contraction
of AJM games [1]. It can be used to interpret the contraction rule on existential formulas,
where it has the effect of taking the union of the different witnesses proposed. But in LK,
one can also use contraction on a universal formula, which will appeal to a strategy like the
second. Any witness proposed by ∀bélard will then have to be propagated to both branches
to ensure that we are winning (mimicking the effect of cut reduction).
In order to define this contraction Σ-strategy along with the tools to revisit the introduction
rules for quantifiers, we will first study some properties of the exponential modalities.
Recall ! and ? from Definition 11, both based on arena ‖ω A. First, we examine their
functorial action. Let σ : AArΣ+ //B. Then, ‖ωσ : ‖ω(A⊥ ‖ B) which is isomorphic to
(‖ωA)⊥ ‖ (‖ωB); overloading notion we still write ‖ω σ :‖ωAArΣ+ // ‖ωB.
I Lemma 42. Let σ : AGaΣ+ //B. Then, we have !σ =‖ω σ : !AGaΣ+ // !B and ?σ =‖ω σ : ?AGaΣ+ //?B.
Rather than defining directly the contraction, we build coϕ : JϕKVGaΣ]V+ // !JϕKV by induction
on ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V). For ϕ quantifier-free, the empty coϕ : JϕKV + // !JϕKV is winning. We
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u
w
vC
π
`V Γ, ϕ, ϕ
`V Γ, ϕ
}

~ = Γ⊥
JπK
T (V)→ ϕ` ϕ
δ⊥
ϕ⊥
T (V)→ ϕ
u
ww
v∀I
π
`V]{x} Γ, ϕ
`V Γ,∀x. ϕ
}

~ = Γ
⊥
coΓ⊥
T (V)→ !Γ⊥
!(∀I (JπK))
T (V)→ !∀x. ϕ
u
w
v∀I
π
`V Γ, ϕ[t/x]
`V Γ,∃x. ϕ
}

~ = Γ⊥
JπK
T (V)→ ϕ[t/x]
∃tϕ
T (V)→ ∃x.ϕ T (V)→ ?∃x.ϕ
Figure 10 Interpretation of the remaining rules of LK.
!A → !!A !A → !A⊗ !A ?!A → !?A !A⊗ !B → !(A⊗ B) !A` !B → !(A` B)
(〈i, j〉, a) 7→ (i, (j, a)) (2i, a) 7→ (1, (i, a)) (i, (j, a)) 7→ (j, (i, a)) (j, (i, a)) 7→ (i, (j, a)) (j, (i, a)) 7→ (i, (j, a))
(2i+ 1, a) 7→ (2, (i, a))
Figure 11 Some win-isos with exponentials whose lifting are used in the interpretation.
get co∀x. ϕ : !∀x. JϕKV + // !!∀x. JϕKV as a particular case of !A + // !!A from Figure 11. We get
coϕ∧ψ and coϕ∨ψ by induction and composition with !A⊗ !B + // !(A⊗B), !A` !B + // !(A`B).
Finally, co?∃x. JϕKx is obtained analogously to the contraction on the right of Figure 9.
I Lemma 43. For any (V ] {x})-game A, there is a winning µA,x : ∃x. !A
V-Ga
+ // !∃x.A.
Proof. After the unique minimal ∀ move (on the left hand side), the strategy simultaneously
plays all the (i,∃) (on the right hand side) with annotation ∀; then proceeds as cc !A. J
We get co?∃x. JϕKx by induction, post-composition with ?µJϕK,x and distribution of ? over !.
I Proposition 44. For any ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V), there is a winning coJϕKV : JϕKV
V-Ga
+ // !JϕKV .
Combining Proposition 44 with other primitives (including !A + //A, playing copy-
cat between A and the 0th copy on the left, closed under receptivity), we get δJϕKV :
JϕKV + //JϕKV ⊗ JϕKV for ϕ ∈ FormΣ(V). We complete the interpretation in Figure 10, omit-
ting W, which is by post-composition with eA and silently using the isomorphism between
winning Σ-strategies from 1 to Γ ` A and from Γ⊥ to A. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 14.
6 Conclusion
For LK there is no hope of preserving unrestricted cut reduction without collapsing to a
boolean algebra [13]. There are non-degenerate models for classical logic with an involutive
negation, e.g. Führman and Pym’s classical categories [9] with reduction only preserved in a
lax sense; but our model does not preserve reduction even in this weaker sense. Besides, our
semantics is infinitary: from the structural dilemma in [8] we obtained a proof of some ∃x. ϕ
with ϕ quantifier-free (no ∀bélard moves) yielding an infinite Σ-strategy (see Appendix B).
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Both phenomena could be avoided by adopting a polarized model, abandoning however
our faithfulness to the raw Herbrand content of proofs. It is a fascinating open question
whether one can find a non-polarized model of classical first-order logic that remains finitary
– this is strongly related to the actively investigated question of finding a strongly normalizing
reduction strategy on syntaxes for expansion trees [15, 21, 16].
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A Counter-examples
In this section, we detail a few counter-examples referred to in the main text.
I Example 45. The neutral Σ-strategies σ1 =
ee11
k
ee22S
e
f(e1)
3
and σ2 =
ee11
k
ee22S
e
f(e2)
3
, have no meet.
Assume they have a meet σ. Necessarily, since ee11 e
e2
2 4 σ1, σ2, then σ must comprise
the events-with-annotations ee11 and e
e2
2 . But we also have
ec1
 %
ec2<yy
e
f(c)
3
4 σ1, σ2
for any constant symbol c. Therefore, σ must also include event-with-annotation et3. But t
must be an instance of f(e1), f(e2); and must instantiate to f(c) for all constant symbol c.
So t must have the form f(e) for some e ∈ [e3], i.e., e ∈ {e1, e2, e3}. It is direct to check that
none of those options gives a neutral Σ-strategy that is below both σ1 and σ2 for 4.
I Example 46. Consider σ : ∀11 + //∀2∀31 and τ : ∀2∀31 + //∀41 two Σ-strategies:
∀11 |
σ // ∀2∀31 ∀2∀31 |
τ // ∀41
∀2_
∀4
*qqx∀3
,rrz
∃∀42_
∃∀31 ∃c3
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where we omit the annotation of negative events, forced by Σ-receptivity.
Their composition has ∀4 _ ∃c1, which is not a minimal strategy since c does not have ∀4
as a free variable.
This counter-example also means that we do not have the adjunction expected from
categorical logic ∃V,x a T (wV,x) a ∀V,x. More precisely, Lemma 40 cannot be strengthened
into an equality. Indeed, note that τ = ∀I x(∀2∀31),1(∃
x
2 _ ∃c3). On the other hand, τ  σ =
∀4 _ ∃c1, which cannot be of the form ∀I
x
∀11,1 – this construction would put no causal link
from ∀4 to ∃c1, since c does not involve the variable x.
The intuition behind this failure is that ∀I xA,B only introduces causal links that follow
occurrences of a variable x. However, after composition, we may end up with Σ-strategies
that are not minimal, i.e., they have immediate causal links not reflecting directly a syntactic
dependency. In other words, in order to get an adjunction as one would expect, only the
term information would have to be retained – but our interpretation remembers more.
B Non-finiteness of the interpretation
From the infinitary primitives in the interpretation, it is natural to expect the interpretation
to be infinitary. It was surprisingly difficult to find such an example, however one can do so
by revisiting standard pathological examples in the proof theory of classical logic, having
arbitrarily large normal forms.
More precisely, we construct an LK proof of the formula ∃x.> whose interpretation is
infinite, despite the fact that there is no move by ∀bélard in the game.
Our starting point is the following proof:
$ =
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
∧I
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥, ϕ⊥
C
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
∧I
` ϕ,ϕ, ϕ⊥ ∧ ϕ⊥
C
` ϕ,ϕ⊥ ∧ ϕ⊥
Cut
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥ ∧ ϕ⊥
This proof is referred to in [8] as a structural dilemma. There are two ways to push the
Cut beyond contraction, as the two proofs interact, and try to duplicate one another. This
is an example of a proof where unrestricted cut reduction does not necessarily terminate;
and which has infinitely large cut-free forms.
In order to construct a proof with an infinite interpretation, we will start with this proof,
with ϕ = ∀x.⊥ ∨ ∃y.>, which to shorten notations we will just write as ∀ ∨ ∃.
Omitting details, here is the interpretation of the left branch of $ (we omit term
annotations, which always coincide with the unique predecessor for ∃loïse’s moves).
u
ww
v
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
Ax
` ϕ,ϕ⊥
∧I
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥, ϕ⊥
C
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥
}

~ =
(∀ ∨ ∃) ∧ (∀ ∨ ∃) , (∃ ∧ ∀)
∀i
 **1∃〈0,i〉
∀j
 ))/∃〈1,j〉
∀k
"mmt $nnu∃k ∃k
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The second branch of $ is symmetric, so we do not make it explicit. Now, we interpret
the Cut rule and the composition yields J$K below.
(∀ ∨ ∃) ∧ (∀ ∨ ∃) , (∃ ∧ ∀) ∧ (∃ ∧ ∀)
∀i
 **1  ++1∃〈0,i〉 ∃〈0,i〉
∀j
 ((/  **0∃〈1,j〉 ∃〈1,j〉
∀k
"mmt %oou∃〈0,k〉 ∃〈0,k〉
∀l
!mms "mmt∃〈1,k〉 ∃〈1,k〉
It is interesting to note that although $ has arbitrarily large cut-free forms, the corres-
ponding strategy only plays finitely many ∃loïse moves for every ∀bélard move. However, we
are on the right path to finding an infinitary Σ-strategy.
The next step is to set (with s some unary function symbol) the proof $2 below with
interpretation
u
www
v
Ax
`x >[s(x)/y],⊥
∃I
`x ∃y.>,⊥
∀I
` ∃y.>,∀x.⊥
W
` ∀x.⊥,∃y.>,∀x.⊥,∃x.>
∨I
` (∀x.⊥ ∨ ∃y.>) ∨ (∀x.⊥ ∨ ∃x.>)
}

~
=
(∀ ∨ ∃) ∨ (∀ ∨ ∃)
∀i ∀j,rrz
∃s(∀j)〈j,0〉
We now use these to compute the interpretation of $3, a cut between $ and $2:
t
$
` ϕ ∧ ϕ,ϕ⊥ ∧ ϕ⊥
$2
` (∀ ∨ ∃) ∨ (∀ ∨ ∃)
Cut
` ϕ ∧ ϕ
|
=
(∀ ∨ ∃) ∧ (∀ ∨ ∃)
∀i
 ''.  **1∃s(∀i)〈0,〈〈0,i〉,0〉〉 ∃
s(∀i)
〈0,〈〈0,i〉,0〉〉
∀j'ppw  ''.
∃s(∀j)〈0,〈〈1,j〉,0〉〉 ∃
s(∀j)
〈0,〈〈1,j〉,0〉〉
We are almost there. It suffices now to note that $3 provides a proof of (∃x.> =⇒
∃x.>) ∧ (∃x.> =⇒ ∃x.>). These two implications can be composed by cutting $3 against
the following proof $4:
u
www
v
Ax
` ∀,∃
Ax
` ∀,∃
∧I
` ∀,∃ ∧ ∀,∃
Ax
` ∀,∃
∧I
` ∀,∃ ∧ ∀,∃ ∧ ∀,∃
Ex
` ∃ ∧ ∀,∃ ∧ ∀,∃,∀
∨I
` (∃ ∧ ∀) ∨ (∃ ∧ ∀),∃ ∨ ∀
}

~
=
(∃ ∧ ∀) ∨ (∃ ∧ ∀) , ∃ ∨ ∀
∀i
 %%,
∀j
 $$,
∀k
"mmt∃k ∃i ∃j
Write $5 for the proof of ∃x.>∨∀y.⊥ obtained by cutting $3 and $4. The interpretation
of $5 is the composition of J$3K and J$4K, which triggers the feedback loop causing
the infiniteness phenomenon. We display below the corresponding interaction. For the
“synchronised” part of formulas, we will use 0 for components resulting from matching dual
quantifiers, and ‖ for components resulting for matching dual propositional connectives.
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We write ◦ for synchronized events (i.e., of neutral polarity), and omit copy indices, which
get very unwieldy. For readability, we also annotate the immediate causal links with the
sub-proof that they originate from, i.e., $3 or $4.
(0 ‖ 0) ‖ (0 ‖ 0) , ∃ ∨ ∀
∀
$4!mms◦∀
$3  &&- $3  **1◦s(∀)
$4  ''.
◦s(∀)
$4  ''.◦s(∀)
$3'ppw $3  ''.
∃s(∀)
◦s(s(∀))
$4  ''.
◦s(s(∀))
$4  ''.◦s(s(∀))
$3(ppw $3  ''.
∃s(s(∀))
◦s3(∀)
$4  ''.
◦s3(∀)
$4  ''.◦s3(∀)
$3%oou $3  ))/
∃s3(∀))
. . . . . . . . .
Therefore, after hiding, ∃loïse responds to an initial ∀bélard move ∀ by playing simultan-
eously all ∃sn(∀), for n ≥ 1. Finally, cutting $5 against a proof of ∃x.> playing a constant
symbol 0, we get a proof $6 of ` ∃x.> whose interpretation plays simultaneously all ∃s
n(0)
for n ≥ 1.
C Compactness
Restricting any winning Σ-strategy σ : JϕK to JϕK∃ (ignoring ∀bélard’s replications) yields
σ∃ : JϕK∃, not necessarily finite. Yet, we will show that it has a finite top-winning sub-strategy.
A game A is a prefix of B if |A| ⊆ |B|, and all the structure coincides on |A|. Notice
that JϕK∃ embeds (subject to renaming) as a prefix of JϕK. Keeping the renaming silent, we
have:
I Lemma 47. For any winning σ : JϕK, setting
|σ∃| = {a ∈ |σ| | [a]σ ⊆ |JϕK∃|}
and inheriting the order, polarity and labelling from σ, we obtain σ∃ : JϕK∃ a winning
Σ-strategy.
Proof. Most conditions are direct. For σ∃ : JϕK∃ winning we use that for any ∃-maximal
x ∈ C∞(σ∃), x ∈ C∞(σ) ∃-maximal as well: this follows from JϕK∃ being itself ∃-maximal
in JϕK. J
As mentioned above, the extracted σ∃ may not be finite! Indeed there are classical
proofs for which our interpretation yields infinite strategies, even after removing ∀bélard’s
replications (see Appendix B). This reflects the usual issues one has in getting strong
normalization in a proof system for classical logic [8] without enforcing too much sequentiality
as with a negative translation.
Despite this, the compactness theorem for propositional logic entails that we can always
extract a finite top-winning sub-strategy. For σ : JϕK∃ any Σ-strategy, we denote C ∀(σ) the
set of ∀-maximal configurations of σ, i.e., they can only be extended in σ by ∃loïse moves –
inheriting all structure from σ they correspond to its sub-strategies, as they are automatically
receptive. The proof relies on:
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I Lemma 48. Let X be a directed set of ∀-maximal configurations. Then, WJϕK∃(
⋃
X) is
logically equivalent to
∨
x∈XWJϕK∃(x).
Proof. By induction on ϕ, using simple logical equivalences and that if x1 ⊆ x2 are ∀-maximal,
then WJϕK∃(x1) implies WJϕK∃(x2). J
We complete the proof. For σ : JϕK∃ winning, by the lemma above the (potentially
infinite) disjunction of finite formulas∨
x∈C ∀(σ)
WJϕK∃(x)[λσ]
is a tautology. By the compactness theorem there is a finite X = {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ C ∀(σ) such
that
∨
x∈XWJϕK∃(x)[λσ] is a tautology – w.l.o.g. X is directed as C ∀(σ) is closed under
union. By Lemma 48 again, WJϕK∃(
⋃
X)[λσ] is a tautology. So, restricting σ to events
⋃
X
gives a top-winning finite sub-strategy of σ.
Although this argument is non-constructive, the extraction of a finite sub-strategy can
still be performed effectively: Σ-strategies and their operations can be effectively presented,
and the finite top-winning sub-strategy can be computed by Markov’s principle.
